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Introduction 
 
Human beings with normal, trichromatic vision have the capacity to discriminate 
approximately 2 million different shades of color (Pointer & Attridge 1998, Linhares et al. 
2008, Kuehni 2013).1 Despite the fine-grained specificity with which we perceive color, 
we tend to think and speak about color in terms of a comparatively much small number 
of coarse-grained categories. English, for example, contains only eleven basic color terms 
(BCTs) – ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘red’, ‘yellow’, ‘green’, ‘blue’, ‘brown’, ‘orange’, ‘pink’, ‘purple’, 
and ‘grey’ – while the unwritten languages of many non-industrialized societies contain 
as few as two or three BCTs.2  
 
A long-standing debate in cognitive science, linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy 
concerns the basis of human color categorization and naming practices. Are there 
psychologically or culturally universal constraints on how speakers of different languages 
sort fine-grained shades of color into compact sets of coarse-grained categories? Or is it 
rather the case that ‘each culture has taken the spectral continuum and divided it on a 
basis which is quite arbitrary except for pragmatic considerations’ (Ray 1953: 102)? One 
aim of this chapter is to survey some of the recently more influential ways of answering 
these questions.  
 
																																																								
1 The number of perceptually distinct surface colors actually present in natural scenes, however, 
is probably much smaller (Marín-Franch & Foster 2010). 
2 A color term is said to be basic, when among other things it is monolexemic, e.g., ‘blue’ vs. ‘sky 
blue’ or ‘dark blue’, applied to different types of objects, and used by most speakers of the language 
in which it occurs (Berlin & Kay 1969). For discussion, see the entry by Dedrick in this volume. 
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Another related question concerns the relationship between color naming practices and 
color perception. Do linguistic representations of color categories influence the way 
human beings visually experience color? In particular, can learning to use a set of color 
terms cause shades that straddle a category boundary to appear phenomenally less similar 
(and, hence, easier to discriminate) or cause shades that fall within the boundaries of a 
named category to appear phenomenally more similar (and, hence, harder to 
discriminate)? If so, then visually perceiving color, like phoneme discrimination in 
language (Liberman & Mattingly 1985, Harnad 1986, Kuhl 2004), may be described as 
‘categorical’. Alternatively, linguistic representations of color categories might influence 
the speed or accuracy with which fine-grained shades colors are discriminated or 
remembered without having any effects on their appearance. 
 
The color categorization debate has been traditionally framed as a conflict between 
‘universalist’ and ‘relativist’ conceptions of the relation between language, thought, and 
perception (for helpful overviews, see Dedrick 1998, 2005, 2014a; Hardin 2005; Jameson 
2005; Regier & Kay 2009; Regier et al. 2010; Roberson & Hanley 2010; Roberson 2012; 
Winawer & Witthoft 2012; and Lindsey & Brown 2014).3 To simplify greatly, strong 
universalism maintains (1) that coarse-grained color concepts corresponding to BCTs are 
unlearned, psychological universals that recur across maximally different cultures; (2) that 
the psychological universality of these color concepts is due to the perceptual salience of 
their best examples or ‘foci’; and, finally, (3) that the representation of color categories in 
language has no influence on the way colors are represented at the level of either thought 
or perception. Strong linguistic relativism, in contrast, denies claim (1): basic color concepts 
aren’t psychological universals, but vary instead with cultural and communicative needs. 
Hence, there are no cross-cultural patterns in color categorization and color-naming 
practices that demand scientific explanation, as assumed by claim (2). Strong linguistic 
relativists also deny claim (3), maintaining instead that color terms are the primary 
vehicles of color category representation and, strikingly, that an object’s apparent color 
can vary as a function of the color terms present in the perceiver’s language. In denying 
claim (3), strong linguistic relativism has an affinity with the writings of Benjamin Lee 
Whorf (1956). 
 
As will be shown below, this stark way of framing the color categorization debate has 
probably outlived its usefulness. On the one hand, prominent universalists no longer 
maintain that considerations of perceptual salience are what best account for the cross-
cultural recurrence of certain basic color concepts. They also accept that color language 
can have experimentally measurable effects on color memory and color discrimination 
tasks. In other words, they have distanced themselves from claims (2) and (3) above. On 
the other hand, prominent linguistic relativists now deny that so-called color ‘categorical 
perception’ effects are properly interpreted as effects of language on the way colors 
visually appear. Speakers of different languages do not experience the colors present in 
their environment in different ways. Both sides of the debate, in short, have moved closer 
toward the moderate center of the theoretical spectrum between strong universalism and 
strong linguistic relativism. 																																																								
3 Also see the target articles by Saunders & van Brakel 1997 and Steels & Belpaeme 2005 in 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences and their invited commentaries for valuable discussions. 
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In the next two sections of this chapter, I critically examine two of the main approaches 
to color categorization in cognitive science: the perceptual salience theory and linguistic 
relativism. I then turn to reviewing several decades of psychological research on color 
categorical perception (CP). A careful assessment of relevant findings suggests that most 
of the experimental effects that have been understood in terms of CP actually fall on the 
cognition side of the perception-cognition divide: they are effects of color language, for 
example, on memory or decision-making. 
 
The perceptual salience theory 
 
Theories of color categorization can be distinguished by the constraints that they 
respectively impose on the color concept formation process. Two constraints, however, 
appear to be common ground across different theories. The first is grouping by similarity (or 
grouping for short). Debi Roberson and co-authors write: 
 
There are, indeed, constraints on color categorization linked to the properties of 
the visual system. The most important constraint would be that similar items (as 
defined by perceptual discrimination) are universally grouped together. Thus, no 
language would exhibit categories that include two areas of color space but 
excludes an area between them.... Grouping by similarity can explain, for 
example, why there is no composite category that includes yellow and blue but 
excludes green. There is no associative chain of similarity that could connect 
yellow to blue without passing through green (2000: 395). 
 
A second shared constraint is that color categorization systems are constructed so as 
maximize perceptual similarity within categories, while minimizing perceptual similarity 
between different categories (Garner 1974). Since systems that comport with this 
constraint, other things being equal, are more informative, i.e., communicatively efficient, 
than those that don’t (Jameson & D’Andrade 1997, Jameson 2005a, Jameson 2005b, 
Regier et al. 2007, Regier et al. 2015), I shall here refer to it as the informativeness constraint. 
 
Proponents of the perceptual salience theory (Rosch 1973; Kay & McDaniel 1978; Hardin 
1988, 2005; Kay et al. 1997; Kay & Maffi 1999; Kay & Regier 2003; Kuehni 2005a) 
maintain that a third universal constraint on color categorization and naming comes from 
the way in which human beings experience color. The ‘basic linguistic categories 
themselves,’ C.L Hardin writes, ‘have been induced by perceptual saliencies common to 
the human race’ (1988:168).  
 
According to the theory, certain shades of color, in particular, the ‘Hering primaries’ 
black, white, unique red (UR), unique yellow (UY), unique green (UG), and unique blue 
(UB) (Hering 1878/1964), are especially salient in visual experience prior to their 
representation in either language or thought. (I shall follow Byrne & Hilbert 1997 in 
referring to these chromatic shades collectively as the 4UH.) The perceptual salience or 
‘attention-grabbingness’ of these shades is often said to arise from their distinctively pure 
or non-mixed appearance. As Justin Broackes puts it, ‘There are no purples that do not 
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look to have some red and some blue in them, no turquoises that do not in some way 
seem bluish and also greenish; but there are reds that don’t look in any way bluish or 
yellowish and yellows that seem to contain no hint of either red or green’ (Broackes 2011: 
602). It has also been argued that terms for the 4UH are both necessary and sufficient for 
linguistically describing all of the other colors (Sternheim & Boynton 1966; Hurvich 1981, 
chap. 5). This fact, Hardin says, ‘justifies singling them out as perceptually elementary’ 
and as having ‘psychological primacy’ (2005: 74). Byrne and Hilbert (2003) go beyond 
Hardin in arguing that colors are actually represented in visual experience itself in terms 
of the proportions of the primary hue-magnitudes that they contain. For example, a 
surface will look purple to a perceiver just in case it is represented in her experience as 
having roughly equal proportions of UR and UB, but relatively low proportions of UG 
and UY (Byrne & Hilbert 2003: 14).4  
 
According to the best known version of the salience theory, the Hering primaries function 
as ‘natural prototypes’ in color concept formation (Rosch 1973): whether a shade belongs 
in the category red, for example, is based on its perceived similarity to UR; whether a 
shade is in the category blue is based on its perceived similarity to UB; and so on. The 
Hering primaries, as Paul Kay and Luisa Maffi put it, thus function as ‘perceptual 
landmarks [that] individually or in combination form the basis of the denotation most of 
the major color terms of most of the languages of the world’ (1999: 774).  
 
The perceptual salience theory is an expression of universalism about the relationship 
between language and thought in the color domain. ‘[F]ar from being a domain well 
suited to the study of the effects of language on thought,’ Eleanor Rosch concluded at the 
end of her influential ‘Universals in color naming and memory’ (Rosch Heider 1972), ‘the 
color space would seem to be a prime example of the influence of underlying perceptual-
cognitive factors on the formation and reference of linguistic categories’ (20). Unlike the 
relativist views considered below, universalism maintains that, in representing color, 
‘languages make semantic distinctions drawn from a palette of universally available 
options’ (Regier et al. 2010: 165). 
 
Early sources of empirical support for the salience theory came from Rosch’s pioneering 
studies of color naming and color memory among the Dugum Dani, a hunter-gatherer 
tribe living in the highlands of western New Guinea, (Rosch Heider 1972; Rosch Heider 
& Olivier 1972; Rosch 1973). One of Rosch’s goals was to test the linguistic relativistic 
hypothesis that ‘verbal color coding acts on memory imagery such that the “structure” of 
colors in memory comes to resemble the “structure” of color names in a given language’ 
(Rosch Heider & Olivier 1972: 338). The Dani have only two BCTs, which divide color 
space into warm-light and cool-dark regions. Hence, linguistic relativism predicts that the 
Dani performance on color memory tasks should significantly differ from that of English 
speakers, who use many more BCTs. 
 
At odds with what the linguistic relativist would predict, Rosch and Olivier found ‘no 
indication that the differences between the naming structures for the two languages 																																																								
4 It should be emphasized, however, that Byrne & Hilbert, 1997 reject the claim that the 
perceptual salience of the Hering primaries is by itself explanatory of color-naming practices.  
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carried over in parallel fashion to the two memory structures’ (1972: 350). On the 
contrary, the Dani and English speakers exhibited similar confusions in memory. For 
instance, good examples of color categories named in English such as red, blue, and green 
were better remembered by Dani participants than colors less easily named by English 
speakers. These findings were taken to furnish strong support for the view that certain 
perceptually salient colors are ‘the cognitive underpinning for cross-language naming 
universals’ (Kay & Regier 2007: 290). 
 
This account was subsequently challenged two decades later by the work of Jules 
Davidoff, Debi Roberson, and others on the Berinmo of Papua New Guinea and the 
Himba of Northern Namibia (Davidoff et al. 1999, Roberson et al. 2000; Roberson et al. 
2002; Roberson et al. 2005). Davidoff and Roberson found no evidence in their studies of 
short-term memory and long-term category learning indicating that Berinmo and Himba 
speakers find it easier to recall basic color categories named in English than those named 
in their own languages. Further, in similarity and forced-choice recognition memory 
judgment tasks, Berinmo and Himba speakers exhibited categorical perception (CP) 
effects for color boundaries that were marked in their own languages, but not for the 
supposedly universal boundary between green and blue marked in English and other 
written languages (Roberson et al. 2005). (These studies and the proper interpretation of 
putative color CP effects will be addressed later in this chapter.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
FIGURE 1  (A) Munsell color palette and (B) contour plot of WCS best-example 
choices compared with best examples of English color terms for the chromatic Hering 
primaries.  
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A second, more important source of evidence for the salience theory is linguistic. To date 
there have been two large-scale investigations of cross-cultural color-naming practices, 
the landmark study of 20 different written languages conducted by Brent Berlin and Paul 
Kay (1969) and the more recent World Color Survey (WCS), which identified BCTs in 
an additional 110 unwritten languages (Kay, Berlin, Maffi, et al. 2009). On the basis of 
their findings, Berlin and Kay advanced two hypotheses. First, ‘although different 
languages encode in their vocabularies different numbers of basic color categories, a total 
inventory of exactly eleven basic color categories exists from which the eleven or fewer 
basic color categories of any given language are always drawn’ (Berlin & Kay 1969: 2). In 
the lexicon of American and British English, the eleven basic categories are picked out by 
the terms ‘black,’ ‘white,’ ‘red,’ ‘yellow,’ ‘green,’ ‘blue,’ ‘brown,’ ‘orange,’ ‘pink,’ ‘purple,’ 
and ‘grey’. Second, BCT inventories evolve through time by incorporating these 
categories in a highly constrained sequence, starting with just two BCTs referring to the 
composite categories warm/light and dark/cool. 
 
The Word Color Survey (WCS) collected color naming data from 110 unwritten 
languages spoken in small, non-industrialized societies (Kay et al. 2009). Speakers were 
asked to name each of 320 maximally saturated Munsell colors and 10 grey-scale colors, 
presented in random order, from the array reproduced in Fig. 1(A). They were also 
asked to demonstrate the best examples or foci of each of their named colors.  
 
Regier et al. 2005 calculated how many best-example ‘hits’ fell on each chip of the array 
for all speakers interviewed in the WCS. The contour plot in Fig. 1(B) shows the number 
of WCS best-example hits that fell on each chip in the chromatic portion of the stimulus 
array (with a contour interval of 100 hits). The black dots correspond to the foci of the 
English color terms ‘red’, ‘yellow’, ‘green’, and ‘blue’ provided by one American speaker 
(Berlin & Kay 1969). As indicated by the contour plot, the best examples of named 
chromatic color categories across the 110 languages of the WCS cluster around the best 
examples of four English terms: G1 (focal red), C9 (focal yellow), F17 (focal green), and 
F29 (focal blue). Regier et al. 2005 also found that best examples of BCTs are more tightly 
clustered across the languages of the WCS than are the centroids of category extensions. 
‘This pattern’, they write, ‘would be expected if best examples reflect universal foci against 
a background of cross-linguistically varying category extensions. However, it would not 
be predicted if best examples are abstracted instead as the centers of categories defined at 
their boundaries by linguistic convention, because on this latter view, best examples are 
category centers and will cluster only as tightly as those centers’ (2005: 8389). 
 
Critics have posed a number of challenges to the methodology used to collect cross-
cultural naming data for the WCS. Use of highly saturated color stimuli, Roberson & 
Hanley 2010 argue, may have led researchers to overestimate the similarity of color 
categorization systems across different languages. Others have questioned the 
foundational assumption that every language contains a set of BCTs in the sense of Berlin 
& Kay 1969 (Levinson 2001). 
 
These methodological criticisms notwithstanding, there appears to be converging 
linguistic evidence for the existence of cross-cultural tendencies in color-naming practices. 
Lindsey & Brown 2006 performed a cluster analysis on the individual color-naming 
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systems of the 2,367 informants in the WCS. At the level of 8 clusters, they found a close 
correspondence between clusters in the WCS naming data and familiar English 
chromatic color categories. Two exceptions were a composite yellow-or-orange category, 
and, a composite green-or-blue category (grue). A second cluster analysis by Lindsey & 
Brown 2009 found that WCS color-naming systems can be divided into approximately 
four recurrent patterns or ‘motifs’. 
 
Despite evidence for the existence of cross-cultural tendencies in color naming-practices, 
the perceptual salience theory has been recently abandoned as an account of how 
lexicalized color categories are formed. Three main objections recur in the literature. 
First, even if the best examples of color categories across many languages in the WCS 
cluster around the Hering primaries (4UH plus black and white), the perceptual salience 
theory is only a name for this fact, not explanation of it (Byrne & Hilbert 1997, Dedrick 
1997, Jameson 2005a, 2005b). Regier and co-authors (2005) appear to concede this point: 
 
The degree to which... universally favored regions [of color space] are based on 
color appearance, universal statistical tendencies in the distribution of reflective 
surfaces in the environment, universal properties of ambient light sources, the 
topography of perceptual color space, or sociolinguistic negotiation among 
speakers cannot be assessed with any degree of certainty at this time. It is possible 
that all these factors, and perhaps others, play a role (Regier et al. 2005: 8390). 
 
A second objection has to do with the variation in unique hue settings across observers 
with normal, trichromatic color vision. Fig. 2 presents the Munsell hue diagram with 
angular ranges in unique hue selections for approximately 300 normal, trichromat 
subjects (Kuehni 2005b). The broadness of the ranges of stimuli selected for the 4UH hues 
is large, with variation in settings for UG alone spanning nearly 30% of the complete hue 
circle. One surprising consequence of this variability is that some observers will select as 
their best example of orange a stimulus that other observers respectively choose as their 
best example of UY or UR (Malkoc et al. 2005: 2156). Such dramatic variability in the 
way human beings perceive color speaks against the view that the 4UH function as pan-
human ‘perceptual landmarks’ that stabilize color naming practices within and across 
linguistic communities (Jameson 2010). 
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FIGURE 2  Munsell hue diagram with ranges of color chip stimuli selected for 
the four unique hues. Reproduced with permission from Kuehni 2005a. 
 
A final set of criticisms pose empirical objections to the assumption that the 4UH are 
perceptually more salient than other shades. Boynton 1997 found that when criteria of 
intra-subjective consistency in naming, consensus in naming, and short response times are 
applied, ‘there are no differences between primary and derived basic colors [like pink and 
brown] except for the compound sensory aspect of the latter, which really does not seem 
to matter’ (148). Similarly, Smallman & Boynton 1990 and Smallman & Boynton 1993 
report that when embedded in visual information displays, best examples of English BCTs 
are not detected faster than other shades that are as widely separated in color space. More 
recent studies have also failed to find greater intersubjective consistency in stimuli 
selection for the 4UH than for binary hues. Malkoc et al. 2002, in fact, report more 
consistency in subjects’ choices for ‘focal’ blue-green than for UB and UG: in other words, 
there was less variability in selecting the boundary between blue and green than in 
selecting the best example of either category. Relatedly, Bosten & Lawrance-Owen 2014 
found that subjects do not select examples of the 4UH in a display containing a complete 
hue circle more reliably than they select best examples of binary hues. According to 
Hardin, names for the 4UH are necessary and sufficient for naming all of the other colors, 
‘a fact that justifies singling them out as perceptually elementary’ (2005: 74). A recent 
study by Bosten & Boehm 2014 challenges this assessment. Subjects were assigned to one 
of two experimental conditions in a hue-scaling experiment. In the ‘unique’ condition, 
they rated the proportions of UR, UY, UB, and UG that they perceived in each of a series 
of test stimuli. In the ‘intermediate’ condition, they rated the proportions of the binary 
colors teal, purple, orange, and lime. Results from the two conditions were found to be 
broadly the same. English speakers, Bosten and Boehm conclude, don’t need to use names 
for the 4UH in order adequately to describe color appearances. 
	 9	
 
In the last decade, erstwhile proponents of the perceptual salience theory have gravitated 
toward the view that cross-cultural patterns in color naming may result from application 
of the informativeness constraint together with the irregular shape of color space, as 
originally proposed by Kimberly Jameson and Roy D’Andrade (1997). Jameson and 
D’Andrade point out that the color solid isn’t a smooth globe, but an irregular blob with 
several large ‘bumps’. For example, the regions around UR and UY achieve more 
saturation and, hence, protrude more from the solid than do the regions around UB and 
UG. The bumpy shape of perceptual color space, they argue, means that certain ways of 
partitioning color space into a small number of categories will be more informative than 
others (Jameson & D’Andrade 1997: 313; see also Jameson 2005a). 
 
Building on this interpoint-distance model (IDM), Terry Regier and co-authors have 
recently proposed a ‘shape-based’ account of color categorization, according to which 
naming systems across languages partition color space in different, but close to optimally 
informative ways (Regier et al. 2007 2009; Regier et al. 2015): ‘The hypothesis is that... 
irregularities in [color] space, interacting with general principles of categorization, cause 
natural clusters to form that correspond to observed color-naming universals’ (Regier et 
al. 2007: 1437). Regier et al. 2007 introduce the notion of well-formedness as a measure of 
the extent to which a lexical color categorization system maximizes perceptual similarity 
of colors within a category and minimizes it across categories, where the perceptual 
similarity of two shades is inversely related to the distance between them in the CIELAB 
color space. Color-naming systems documented in the WCS, they argue, tend to have 
higher well-formedness than do systematic variants with the same number of categories, 
and attested divergences in the location of category boundaries tend to have only a minor 
impact on relative well-formedness. On this approach, cross-cultural patterns in color 
naming practices aren’t explained by any privileged set of focal colors. Instead, they result 
from the structure of perceptual color space, the pragmatic need to communicate 
efficiently about color, and cognitively universal categorization principles. 
 
The IDM is perhaps the most prominent of recent attempts to explain recurrent patterns 
in color-naming practices without appealing to the perceptual salience of the 4UH. Other 
approaches have also attracted attention. Yendrikhovskij 2001, building on Shepard 
1992, links the structure of human color categorization systems to the statistical 
distribution of colors in the natural environment. Steels and Belpaeme (2005) employ 
theoretical models and computer simulations of artificial agents to investigate the different 
ways in which the physiology of the human visual system, the color statistics of natural 
scenes, and communicative needs respectively constrain the acquisition of a shared set of 
color categories. Jameson and Komarova (2009a, 2009b) use agent-based, evolutionary 
game theory to explore the consequences of empirically observed heterogeneity in human 
color-processing mechanisms, e.g., the absence of either long- or short-wavelength cones 
in dichromat observers, for the development color categorization systems. They argue 
that evolved color categorization systems tend to optimize communication among all 
members of the population, rather than only among members of the majority trichromat 
subset. 
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Linguistic relativism 
 
Moderate linguistic relativism, as I shall call it, comprises three distinct claims: 
 
(LR1) There are no psychologically universal constraints on color categorization 
beyond perceptual grouping and informativeness and the structure of perceptual color 
space (Roberson et al. 2000; Roberson et al. 2005; Jameson 2005a, 2005b). Other 
non-universal constraints come from cultural or pragmatic needs, e.g., the need 
to distinguish in communication between edible and non-edible fruits, as well as 
from the distribution of shades in the natural and social environment. 
 
(LR2) The process of color category formation begins with boundary 
demarcation, and best examples or foci are extracted only at secondary stage of 
conceptual development (Roberson et al. 2000). 
 
(LR3) Color terms are the primary vehicles of color category representation 
(Quine 1973; Roberson et al. 2000; Davidoff 2001a, 2001b; Roberson et al. 2005): 
‘the results of recent experimental research would suggest that there are no 
cognitive color categories that are independent of the terms used to describe them’ 
(Roberson 2005: 66). This claim reflects a robustly ‘cognitive’ conception of color 
language.5  
 
Strong linguistic relativism endorses a fourth, additional claim concerning the influence 
of color terminology on the content and phenomenal character of color experience. 
 
(LR4) Learning to use a set of BCTs can cause shades that fall within the 
boundaries of a named category to appear phenomenally more similar to one 
another in appearance and shades that fall on opposite sides of a category 
boundary to appear phenomenally less alike. The ‘structure of linguistic 
categories,’ as Davidoff puts it, ‘distorts perception by stretching perceptual 
distances at category boundaries’ (2001: 386). 
 
In maintaining LR1, linguistic relativists deny that certain perceptually salient shades 
constrain processes of color concept formation (Roberson et al. 2000). The perceptual 
grouping and informativeness constraints by themselves, however, place only loose 
restrictions on the construction of color categorization systems. Among other things, they 
leave open how the different, independently variable dimensions of color appearance, 
that is, hue, saturation, and lightness, are to be respectively weighted in perceptual 
grouping, as attested by the significant amount of variability in weightings across 
empirically observed categorization systems (Jameson 2005a, 2005b). Further, application 
of the grouping constraint, as Dedrick has pointed out, presupposes prior identification of 
certain ‘chromatic landmarks’:  
 																																																								
5 For discussions of cognitive or ‘extracommunicative’ theories of language, see Clark 1998 and 
Carruthers 2002. 
	 11	
...there is no principled way to delimit the range of a linguistic color category that 
is constructed on the basis of generalization from a single sample. No way, that is, 
to know when to stop the process of associating color samples to one another. This 
problem is solved if judgement involves relative similarity: sample x is more like A 
than like B. With A and B (or whatever number of landmark colors) fixed, there is 
a cognitive constraint upon attribution of category membership (Dedrick 1998: 
156).  
 
The informativeness constraint also leaves a lot of wiggle room in the construction of color 
categorization systems. It ensures that systems will be communicatively efficient, but it 
does not specify how many categories a system should contain. 
 
On analogy with Chomsky’s ‘principles-and-parameters’ approach to linguistic syntax 
(Chomsky 1995), we can think of grouping and informativeness as universal cognitive 
rules that govern the production of color categorization systems. The selection of 
chromatic landmarks, dimensional weightings, and number of categories, in turn, can be 
thought of as setting parameters on application of these universal rules. It is a core tenet 
of linguistic relativism that the values of these parameters are determined locally by 
culture and language. This means that considerable variation across color naming systems 
is, in principle, possible.6 
 
According to the perceptual salience theory, basic color concepts are formed by setting 
up boundaries around regions in three-dimensional color space centered on the Hering 
primaries. In this respect, the representation of category foci or best examples is 
psychologically prior to the representation of category boundaries. Linguistic relativism, 
by contrast, maintains that the process of color category formation begins with the 
demarcation of boundaries in color space that are significant to observers for perhaps 
culturally quite local reasons (LR2).  
 
An illustrative example is the wor-nol category boundary in Berinmo (Roberson et al. 2000). 
The term ‘wor’ applies to leaves that are ready to fall from a tree, covering shades of 
yellow, orange, khaki, and brown. The term ‘nol’ covers shades of chartreuse, green, blue, 
and purple This wor-nol boundary, Roberson and her co-authors emphasize, is far from 
arbitrary: ‘tulip leaves, a favorite vegetable, are bright green when freshly picked and good 
to eat, but quickly yellow if kept. Agreement over the [wor-nol] boundary coincides with 
agreement over when they are no longer good to eat and is highly salient in a community 
that talks little about color’ (Roberson et al. 2000: 395). By contrast, the ability to identify 
certain shades as the best examples or foci of the categories wor and nol is pragmatically 
much less important to the Berinmo and is argued to emerge only during a second phase 
of conceptual development: ‘Once a category has been delineated at the boundaries, 
exposure to exemplars may lead to the abstraction of a central tendency so that observers 
behave as if their categories have prototypes’ (Roberson et al. 2000: 395). 																																																								
6 The perceptual salience theory, by contrast, maintains that color categorization systems in all 
languages are based on a universal set of chromatic landmarks –black, white, UR, UY, UG, and 
UB – and, accordingly, that hue is universally the most heavily weighted dimension of variation 
in color appearance. 
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The view that color terms shape the way human beings think about color is supported by 
empirical findings adduced on behalf of LR3, that is, the claim that color terms are the 
primary vehicles of color category representation. On this view, internalized color language 
is the medium in which human beings think thoughts involving coarse-grained color 
categories.  
 
Support for LR3 comes from neuropsychological studies of subjects with color naming 
deficits (but otherwise normal vision) who also exhibit impairments in the performance of 
seemingly non-linguistic color categorization tasks. Roberson et al. 1999 report that a 
neuropsychological patient with severe impairments in color naming is unable to sort 
colored stimuli into groups except by pair-wise similarity. The same patient is also unable 
to judge which of three objects differs from the other two in an odd-color-out task 
(Davidoff & Roberson 2004). Similar findings have been reported by the Lupyan lab at 
the University of Wisconsin. Lupyan & Mirman 2013 asked aphasic subjects to select 
objects from a group of twenty pictured objects using either a high-dimensional, 
‘thematic’ category criterion (e.g., FRUIT, TOOLS, or FARM ANIMALS) or a low-
dimensional, ‘taxonomic’ category criterion (e.g., BLUE, SMALL, or ROUND). They 
found that aphasics do not perform well on trials that require selection on the basis of a 
low-dimensional criterion and that the degree of impairment was predicted by their 
previously assessed naming performance. Categories ‘held together by one or a small 
number of dimensions’, Lupyan and Mirman write, ‘may require more on-line support 
from language. For example, the ability to selectively attend to objects having a particular 
color – classifying objects into a category of RED THINGS – may be facilitated by 
naming insofar as words such as “red” help to group together objects that do not have 
pre-existing semantic associations and which differ substantially in surface appearance 
(e.g., a cherry and a brick)’ (2013: 1191). Consistent with this view, there is evidence that 
verbal interference selectively impairs normal subjects’ ability to focus on particular 
perceptual dimensions such as size or color. In fact, under verbal interference conditions, 
normal subjects have been reported to perform much like aphasic patients in odd-color-
out tasks (Lupyan 2009).  
 
Additional support for LR3 come from studies of color term acquisition and color 
memory. Roberson and co-authors studied color name learning and color memory 
patterns in Berinmo and Himba speakers (Roberson et al 2000; Roberson et al. 2005a; 
Roberson et al. 2005b). Contrary to findings garnered by Eleanor Rosch (Rosch Heider 
1972, Heider & Olivier 1972), they found no evidence that the supposedly universal or 
‘prototypical’ color categories named in English are either learned or remembered more 
easily than the best examples of the participants’ own linguistic categories. A 3-year, 
longitudinal study of color term acquisition among young children learning to speak either 
English or Himba also found no learning advantage for English BCTs (Roberson et al. 
2004). While these results don’t conclusively establish that color categorization is generally 
language-dependent, they do pose a challenge to the view that the process of BCT 
acquisition is guided by a pre-linguistic system that groups fine-grained shades into a 
universal set of coarse-grained categories. 
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Critics of linguistic relativism have put forward two main objections. The first has to do 
with patterns in color-naming across different languages. Linguistic relativism is 
frequently taken to imply that color naming is ‘largely a matter of arbitrary linguistic 
convention’ (Regier & Kay 2009: 52). But, if so, then lexical color categorization systems 
could be expected to vary freely from one language to another. This prediction, however, 
is at odds with evidence for recurrent motifs in color-naming practices discussed in the 
last section (Regier et al. 2005; Lindsey & Brown 2006 2009). 
 
Linguistic relativists have two ways of responding to this objection. The first is that the 
objection targets a straw man: color-naming practices, according to the version of 
linguistic relativism advanced by Roberson and her colleagues, aren’t arbitrary: 
 
Even if there are genuine similarities between certain color systems, there are 
obvious cultural factors that could explain at least some of these similarities. 
Similar cultural needs, such as evolutionary pressure for successful frugivory, 
could also cause some category divisions to be more likely than others. Cultural 
contact between speakers of different languages has also clearly increased the 
similarity of the color categorization systems that these languages employ; for 
example, the term burou can be traced from German to Herero and subsequently 
to Himba (Robertson 2012: 42). 
 
In addition to appealing to common cultural and environmental factors, linguistic 
relativists can also appeal to common categorization principles. Indeed, as pointed out at 
the end of the last section, recent universalist models have explored the hypothesis that 
cross-cultural patterns in color categorization result from application of the 
informativeness constraint to an irregularly shaped color space. Systems containing the 
same number of categories that conform to the informativeness constraint will partition 
color space in similar, ‘well-formed’ ways (Regier et al. 2015). 
 
Whereas the first objection had to do with evidence for convergence in color-naming 
across different languages, the second objection has to do with evidence for intersubjective 
divergence in color-naming within languages. Webster and Kay (2005) write: 
 
[A] prominent property of actual color-naming data is the pronounced variation 
among speakers of the same language.... For example, the wavelengths that 
individuals select for unique green within a linguistically homogeneous group span 
a range of more than 80 nm; these variations are in fact so large that the same 
wavelength might be chosen as unique green by one observer and unique yellow 
or blue by another (Kuehni 2004) .... Mean foci across languages vary much less 
than individual foci within languages. This suggests that a common language 
imposes only a weak constraint, and a difference in language produces relatively 
little divergence (512; for a similar assessment, see Lindsey & Brown 2014: 524). 
 
Two lines of response are open to the linguistic relativist. First, the surprising amount of 
within-language variability in color-naming is a problem for all theories of color 
categorization and not just for linguistic relativism. (And, as pointed out in the last section, 
intersubjective differences in color perception present a special challenge to theories that 
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base color-naming practices on panhuman universals of color experience.) Second, 
intersubjective variation in color processing may be smoothed over by linguistic charity: 
minor differences in color naming may often be disregarded as irrelevant to speakers’ 
communicative purposes (Jameson 2005b: 315). In this connection, it is important to 
investigate just how much intersubjective agreement in the use of a set of BCTs is actually 
required for effective communication within a group of speakers and, so, for the 
diachronic stabilization of a color lexicon (Levinson 2001). To answer this question, it is 
necessary to know, among other things, how often fine-grained variations in color 
appearance need to be communicated to ensure successful performance of individual and 
multi-agent tasks. Objects belonging to a certain artifactual or natural kind, for example, 
may vary quite a bit in color appearance across subjects, but much of that variation may 
not affect how agents interact with or communicate about the kind. 
 
Strong linguistic relativism goes beyond moderate linguistic relativism in maintaining that 
color perception is categorical: learning to use a set of BCTs causes shades that fall within 
the boundaries of a named category to appear phenomenally more similar to one another 
in appearance and shades that fall on opposite sides of a category boundary to appear 
phenomenally less similar (LR4). In the next section, we will see that there is a substantial 
amount of evidence against this claim. 
 
 
Is color perception categorical? 
 
A categorical perception (CP) effect occurs ‘when (1) a set of stimuli ranging along a physical 
continuum is given one label on one side of a category boundary and another label on the 
other side and (2) the subject can discriminate smaller physical differences between pairs 
of stimuli that straddle that boundary than between pairs that are entirely within one 
category or the other’ (Harnad 1987: 3). The paradigm of CP is phoneme discrimination 
in language: sounds straddling a phonemic category boundary, e.g., the boundary /ra/ 
and /la/ in English, are more discriminable to speakers of a language in which those 
phonemes occur than are sounds separated by equal acoustic step sizes, but from within 
the same phonemic category (Liberman & Mattingly 1985, Kuhl 2004). If color 
perception is similarly categorical (LR4), then acquiring a set of color terms could cause 
shades that straddle a named color category boundary to appear phenomenally less 
similar (and, thus, easier to discriminate) and cause shades that fall within the boundaries 
of a named category to appear phenomenally more similar. 
 
Tarahumara is an indigenous language of northern Mexico in which a single BCT 
(‘siydname’) is used to name both blue and green. In a classic study conducted by Paul 
Kay and Willett Kempton (1984), Tarahumara and English speakers were shown triads 
of Munsell color chips in which only two of the chips fell on the same side of the blue-
green boundary (whether blue or green). They were then asked to select the chip least 
similar in appearance to the other two. They found that English speakers were much more 
likely to choose the chip that fell on the other side of the blue-green boundary, even when 
within-category discrimination distances, as measure by justice noticeable difference 
(JND) steps, were greater than cross-category discrimination distances. Judgments made 
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by Tarahumara speakers, by contrast, did not show any distorting effect of language and 
reflected objective discrimination distances. 
 
What is the proper explanation of this effect? In a recent discussion, Jesse Prinz suggests 
that the ‘presence of a linguistic color boundary between blue and green makes it 
impossible for English-speakers to perceive color distances objectively’ (2012: 187). In 
other words, an object’s apparent fine-grained shade of color can vary as a function of the 
meanings of the color terms present in a speaker’s language, as maintained by strong 
linguistic relativism (LR4). Kay and Kempton, however, explicitly rejected this 
conclusion: ‘it cannot be the case’, they write, ‘that the vision of English speakers is 
distorted in some way by the language they speak, because the discrimination distances 
that the Tarahumara faithfully reproduce on the subjective triads task were established 
on speakers of English’ (1984: 72). Instead, they proposed that English speakers were 
relying on an unconscious, post-perceptual ‘name strategy’, when making their selections: 
 
...faced with this situation the English-speaking subject reasons unconsciously as 
follows: ‘It’s hard to decide here which one looks the most different. Are there any 
other kinds of clues I might use? Aha! A and B are both CALLED green while C 
is CALLED blue. That solves my problem; I’ll pick C as most different.’ Of course 
this cognitive strategy, which we will call the ‘name strategy,’ is not available to 
the Tarahumara speaker precisely because he or she doesn’t have ready lexical 
labels for the concepts green and blue (Kay & Kempton 1984: 72). 
 
To test the name strategy theory, Kay and Kempton conducted a second experiment 
using the same color triads. In each trial, three chips were presented in a box with a sliding 
top that enabled subjects to compare only two chips at a time. The three chips were always 
arranged by hue, so that the middle chip was intermediate in hue between its flankers. 
Here is a description of their method: 
 
Experimenter exposes pair (A, B). ‘You can see that this chip (points to A) is greener 
than this chip (points to B).’ (All subjects readily agreed.) Experimenter slides cover 
so that A is covered and C exposed along with B; that is, the pair (B, C) is now 
exposed, ‘You can see that this chip (points to C) is bluer than this chip (points to 
B).’ (Again all subjects agreed without problems.) ‘Now,’ experimenter hands 
stimuli to subject, ‘you may slide the cover back and forth as often as you like. I’d 
like you to tell me which is bigger: the difference in greenness between the two 
chips on the left or the difference in blueness between the two chips on the right.’ 
 
...The subject cannot reasonably ask himself (herself) whether chip B is called green 
or blue because he (she) has already in effect both called it green and called it blue in 
agreeing to compare B in greenness to A and in blueness to C. It is thus irrelevant to 
this task whether chip B would be called green or blue in another, neutral context 
(Kay & Kempton 1984: 73). 
 
Under these conditions, English and Tarahumara speakers discriminated colors 
identically: ‘Subjective similarity judgments follow discrimination distance and reflect no 
influence from lexical category boundaries’ (1984: 73). This result suggests, contrary to 
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strong linguistic relativism, that color categories in language can exert a distorting 
influence on color similarity judgments without having any effect on the way the colors 
themselves phenomenally appear. In other words, it suggests that color CP effects are 
effects of color language on post-perceptual decision-making or other cognitive processes 
and do not result from a ‘distortion’ of color appearances near category boundaries. If 
this is right, then so-called color categorical perception, as Roberson & Pak 2009 put it, 
‘is categorical but not perceptual, and should rather be referred to simply as a category effect’ (487, 
emphasis added). In the remainder of this section, I adopt this terminological 
recommendation. 
 
Three additional sources of empirical evidence furnish support for the name strategy 
theory. First, subsequent studies have confirmed that language-relative color category 
effects (CCEs) disappear with verbal interference (Roberson & Davidoff 2000, Gilbert et 
al. 2006, Winawer et al. 2007). Winawer and co-authors (2007), for example, looked for 
CCEs in speakers of Russian, who, unlike speakers of English, use distinct terms for dark 
blue (siniy) and light blue (goluboy). Subjects were shown three colored squares arranged in 
a triad and were asked to judge which of the two squares on the bottom was identical in 
color to the square on top. Winawer and co-authors found that Russian speakers’ 
judgments were faster when the shades of the squares on the bottom straddled the siniy-
goluboy boundary, than when they were from within the same category. English speakers 
did not show the same cross-category advantage. Consistent with Kempton and Kay’s 
name strategy theory, CCEs in Russian speakers’ discrimination performance 
disappeared when they performed a simultaneous verbal interference task. 
 
This finding supports a ‘dual code’ model of the involvement of language in color 
discrimination tasks (Roberson & Hanley 2007, Roberson et al. 2008, Roberson & Hanley 
2010, Winawer & Witthoft 2012). Jon Winawer and Nathan Witthoft (2012) write in a 
passage worth quoting at length: 
 
If a category effect goes away when labels become unavailable or not useful, then 
it is unlikely that the effect is due to color terms affecting early perceptual 
processes. While such an account is logically possible, it would require color 
appearance to be altered only during those moments when one is accessing the 
labels. A more parsimonious explanation is that the decision process is affected by 
language. Verbal labels may be used to help keep track of the various stimuli in 
an experiment, either over a memory delay or when comparing stimuli spread 
over space. If, on a particular trial, all the stimuli come from the same verbal 
category (e.g., they are all blue), then labels are unlikely to help accomplish the 
task (and might even hinder performance). In contrast, if stimuli in a trial can 
easily be assigned different labels (e.g., one blue and one green), then access to the 
labels may facilitate memory or the comparison process. If a verbal dual task 
interferes with the ability to label stimuli, even implicitly, then this may eliminate 
one strategy or source of information for accomplishing the task, and hence may 
change performance. Thus, verbal interference effects are more likely to reflect a 
role of color terms on decisions, strategy, and memory, rather than perception (4). 
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A second source of evidence for the name strategy explanation comes from studies that 
have found CCEs to be significantly stronger on the right side of the visual field (RVF) 
than on the left (LVF) (Gilbert et al. 2006, Roberson et al. 2008, Roberson & Pak 2009; for 
a review, see Regier & Kay 2009). This is relevant because stimuli presented in the RVF 
project to the left-hemisphere of the brain, which is typically dominant for language.7 
 
A final source of evidence for the name strategy theory comes experiments that have 
investigated JND thresholds among speakers of languages with different lexicalized color 
categories. If language ‘stretches’ perceptual distances at boundaries between color 
categories (LR4), then discrimination thresholds should be lower at category boundaries, 
that is, shades near category boundaries should be more finely discriminated, than near 
category centers.8 Contrary to predictions based on LR4, Roberson & Pak 2009 found 
that color discrimination is neither enhanced for English speakers at the boundary 
between blue and green boundary, nor for Korean speakers at the boundaries between 
categories that are named in Korean, but not in English. ‘In the case of color,’ they 
suggest, ‘humans may already have hyper-acuity (Churchland & Sejnowski 1994), so that 
no further “tuning” occurs with category learning’ (486).9  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In concluding this chapter, it may be helpful to review some main points of convergence 
between universalists and linguistic relativists about color categorization. To begin with, 																																																								
7 It should be emphasized that the existence of CCEs in the RVF is not uncontroversial. Brown et 
al. 2011 found no CCE on visual search reaction times involving stimuli at the blue-green 
boundary presented in either visual field. ‘Taken as a whole,’ they write, ‘the results and analyses 
suggested that the overall shape of the [reaction time] data sets was controlled entirely by visual 
signals that arise in the cones and are combined in a color-opponent fashion in the earliest stages 
of visual processing’ (2). 
8 Winawer & Witthoft 2012 write: ‘Threshold discrimination experiments are among the least 
ambiguous experiments in psychology.  If an observer can discriminate two stimuli, then we can 
be certain that the observer’s perceptual system has encoded the two stimuli differently. If the 
stimuli are indistinguishable (below threshold), then information distinguishing the stimuli was 
either not encoded or was lost in subsequent processing.  If discrimination thresholds were altered 
by the color terms in one’s language, this would provide the most direct evidence that color terms 
affect perception of colors’ (6). 
9 Regier & Kay 2009 review evidence that prior to language acquisition color categories may be 
represented in the right hemisphere and cause CCEs in the LVF of young infants (Bornstein et al 
1976, Franklin et al. 2005, Franklin et al. 2008). For present purposes, it is important to emphasize 
that even if pre-linguistic infants do exhibit CCEs (but for a skeptical assessment, see Roberson & 
Hanley 2009), the relevant effects don’t appear to facilitate color term acquisition or have any 
other effects on later color cognition. The psychologist Marc Bornstein observes: ‘An otherwise 
reasonable surmise from the fact that hue characterization precedes color naming 
developmentally would be that, in this one realm at least, linguistic identification simply overlays 
perceptual cognitive organization and thereby facilitates semantic development. Paradoxically, it 
does not’ (1985: 74). After language is learned, right hemisphere categories appear to be 
‘permanently erased’ (Regier & Kay 2009: 441). For critical discussion of ‘Bornstein’s paradox’, 
see Dedrick 2014b. 
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there is general agreement on the existence of interesting patterns in color-naming across 
speakers of different languages. Moreover, it is now widely accepted that these patterns 
are not supported by the distinctive appearance or perceptual salience of the Hering 
primaries (4UH plus black and white). Second, prominent universalists now accept that 
color category effects (CCEs) are language relative. Kay and Regier (2007), for example, 
agree that ‘there is ample evidence that differences in color category boundaries between 
languages may influence color memory, learning or discrimination...’ (2007: 294). In 
other words, CCEs don’t indicate the existence of pre-linguistic color concepts that 
constrain the construction of color categorization systems across speakers of different 
languages. Finally, contemporary linguistic relativists have distanced themselves from the 
Whorfian view that color language can modulate the phenomenology of color experience: 
CCEs reflect the influence of color terms on memory and decision making rather than on 
the way fine-grained shades of color visually appear.  
 
 
 
References 
 
Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms: Their universality and evolution. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
 
Bornstein, M. H. (1985). On the development of color naming in young children: Data and 
theory. Brain and Language, 26, 72–93. 
 
Bornstein, M. H. (1987). Perceptual categories in vision and audition. In S. Harnad (ed.). 
Categorical perception: The groundwork of cognition (pp. 287–300). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Bornstein, M. H., Kessen, W., & Weiskopf, S. (1976). Color vision and hue categorization in 
young human infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2, 
115–129.  
 
Bornstein, M. H., & Korda, N. O. (1984). Discrimination and matching within and between hues 
measured by reaction times: Some implications for categorical perception and levels of 
information processing. Psychological Research, 46, 207–222.  
 
Bosten, J.M. & Lawrance-Owen, A.J. (2014). No difference in variability of unique hue selections 
and binary hue selections. Journal of the Optical Society of America, 31, A357–364. 
 
Bosten, J.M. & Boehm, A.E. (2014). Empirical evidence for unique hues? Journal of the Optical Society 
of America, 31(4), A385-393. 
 
Boynton, R. (1997). Insights gained from naming the OSA colors. In C. L. Hardin (Ed.) Color 
categories in thought and language, 135-150. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Brown, A. M., Lindsey, D. T., & Guckes, K. M. (2011). Color names, color categories, and color-
cued visual search: Sometimes, color perception is not categorical. Journal of Vision, 11, 2-
21. 
 
	 19	
Carruthers, P. (2002). The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 657-
726.  
 
Churchland, P.S., & Sejnowski, T.J. (1994). The computational brain. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Chomsky, Noam. (1995). The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Clark, A. (1998). Magic words. In P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and thought: 
Interdisciplinary themes (pp. 162–83). Cambridge University Press. 
 
Davidoff, J., (2001). Language and perceptual categorisation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), 382-
387. 
 
Davidoff, J., Davies, I., & Roberson, D. (1999). Colour categories of a stone-age tribe. Nature, 398, 
203–204. 
 
Davidoff, J., Goldstein, J. & Roberson, D. (2009). Nature vs. nurture: The simple contrast. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 102, 246–250. 
 
Dedrick, D. (1997). Colour Categorization and the space between perception and language. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 187-188. 
 
Dedrick, D. (1998). Naming the rainbow: Colour language, colour science, and culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
 
Dedrick, D. (2014a). Colour language, thought, and culture. In F. Sharifiian (Ed.), Routledge 
handbook to mind, language and culture (pp. 270-293). New York: Routledge. 
 
Dedrick, D. (2014b). Bornstein's paradox (redux). In W. Anderson, C. P. Biggam, C. Hough, and 
C. Kay (eds.), Colour studies: A broad spectrum (pp. 181-199). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Franklin, A., Clifford, A., Williamson, E., & Davies, I. R. L. (2005). Color term knowledge does 
not affect categorical perception of color in toddlers. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
90, 114–141.  
 
Franklin, A., Drivonikou, G. V., Bevis, L., Davies, I. R. L., Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2008). 
Categorical perception of color is lateralized to the right hemisphere in infants, but to the 
left hemisphere in adults. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 105, 3221–3225. 
 
Garner, W.R. (1974). The Processing of Information and Structure. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
 
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., & Ivry, R. B. (2006). Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right 
visual field but not the left. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 103, 489–494.  
 
Goldstone, R. L., & Hendrickson, A. T. (2009). Categorical perception. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1, 69–78.  
 
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for philosophers: Unweaving the rainbow. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 
 
	 20	
Hardin, C. L. (2005). Explaining basic color categories. Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of 
Comparative Social Science, 39, 72-87. 
 
Harnad, S. (1987). Psychophysical and cognitive aspects of categorical perception: A critical 
overview. In S. Harnad (ed.), Categorical perception: The groundwork of cognition (pp. 1-28). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hering, E. (1878/1964). Grundzüge der Lehre vom Lichtsinn (Outlines of a theory of the light sense). L.M. 
Hurvich & D. Jameson (trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Jameson, K. A. (2005a). Why GRUE? An interpoint distance model analysis of composite color 
categories. Cross-Cultural Research, 39, 159–204. 
 
Jameson, K. A. (2005b). Culture and Cognition: What is Universal about the Representation of 
Color Experience? The Journal of Cognition & Culture, 5, (3–4), 293–347.  
 
Jameson, K. A., & D’Andrade, R. G. (1997). It’s not really red, green, yellow, blue: An inquiry 
into cognitive color space. In C. L. Hardin & L. Maffi (Eds.), Color categories in thought and 
language (pp. 295–319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Jameson, K. A., & Komarova, N. L. (2009a). Evolutionary models of color categorization. I. 
Journal of the Optical Society of America. A, 26, 1414–1423.  
 
Jameson, K.A., & Komarova, N. L. (2009b). Evolutionary models of categorization. II. Journal of 
the Optical Society of America. A, 26, 1424–1436. 
 
Kay, P., Berlin, B., & Merrifield, W. R. (1991). Biocultural implications of systems of color 
naming. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 1, 12–25.  
 
Kay, P., & Kempton, W. (1984). What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis? American Anthropologist, 86, 
65–78.  
 
Kay, P. and Maffi, L. (1999). Color appearance and the emergence and evolution of basic color 
lexicons. American Anthropologist, 101, 743–60. 
 
Kay, P., & McDaniel, C. (1978). The linguistic significance of the meanings of basic color terms. 
Language, 54, 610–646. 
 
Kay, P. and Regier, T. (2007). Color naming universals: The case of Berinmo. Cognition, 102, 289–
98.  
 
Kay, P., Regier, T., & Cook, R. S. (2005). Focal colors are universal after all. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 8386–8391.  
 
P. Kay, B. Berlin, L. Maffi, W. R. Merrifeld, and R. Cook. (2009). The World Color Survey. Stanford: 
Center for the Study of Language and Information. 
 
Kuehni, R. G. (2003). Color space and its divisions color order from antiquity to the present. Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
	 21	
Kuehni, R. G. (2004) Variability in unique hue selection: A surprising phenomenon. Color Research 
and Application 29:158–62.  
 
Kuehni, R. G. (2005a). Unique Hue Stimulus Choice: A constraint on Hue Category Formation. 
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 5(3-4), 387-408.  
 
Kuehni, R. G. (2005b). Focal Color Variability and Unique Hue Stimulus Variability. Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, 5(3-4), 409-426.  
 
Kuehni, R. G. (2013). Color: An introduction to practice and principles, 3rd Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
 
Levinson, S. C. (1997). Yêlî dyne and the theory of basic color terms. Paper presented in a seminar at the 
Max Plank Institute for Psycholinguistics, June 1997.  
 
Liberman A.M. & Mattingly, I.G. 1985. The motor theory of speech perception revised. Cognition, 
2, 1–36. 
 
Lindsey, D. T., & Brown, A. M. (2006). Universality of color names. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 103, 16608–16613.  
 
Lindsey, D. T., & Brown, A. M. (2009). World color survey color naming reveals universal motifs 
and their within-language diversity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 106, 19785–19790.  
 
Lindsey, D. T., & Brown, A. M. (2014). Color appearance, language, and neural coding. In J.S. 
Werner and L.M Chalupa (eds.), The new visual neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
pp. 511-531. 
 
Linhares, J. M. M., Pinto, P. D., & Nascimento, S. M. C. (2008). The number of discernible colors 
in natural scenes. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, Optics, Image Science, and Vision, 25, 
2918–2924.  
 
Lupyan, G. (2009). Extracommunicative functions of language: Verbal interference causes 
selective categorization impairments. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(4), 711-718. 
 
Lupyan, G. & Mirman, D. (2013). Linking language and categorization: Evidence from 
aphasia. Cortex, 49(5), 1187-1194. 
 
Malkoc, G., Kay, P. & Webster, M. A. (2002) Individual differences in unique and binary hues. 
Journal of Vision 2:32a.  
 
Malkoc, G., Kay, P., Webster, M. A. (2005). Variations in normal color vision. IV. Binary hues 
and hue scaling. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 22, 2154-2168.  
 
Marín-Franch, I. & Foster, D. (2010). Number of perceptually distinct surface colors in natural 
scenes. Journal of Vision, 10(9), 1–7. 
 
Özgen, E., & Davies, I. R. L. (2002). Acquisition of categorical color perception: A perceptual 
learning approach to the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 131, 477–493.  
	 22	
 
Pak, H. S., Kim, I. J., Kim, Y. S., & Lee, M. Y. (2004). An exploratory study on the expressions 
with Korean color- names and modifiers. Journal of Korean Society of Color Studies. 18, 11–
21.  
 
Pak, H. S., & Roberson, D. (2009). Unique hue judgment in different languages: A comparison 
of Korean and English, Journal of Cognitive Science, 10, 21–40. 
 
Pilling, M., Wiggett, A., Özgen, E., & Davies, I. R. L. (2003). Is colour “categorical perception” 
really perceptual? Memory and Cognition, 31, 538–551. 
 
Pointer, M. R., & Attridge, G. G. (1998). The number of discernible colours. Color Research & 
Application, 23(1), 52–54.  
 
Prinz, J. (2012). Beyond human nature. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Quine, W.V.O (1973). The roots of reference. La Salle: Open Court. 
 
Ray, V. (1953). Human color perception and behavioral response. Transactions of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 2(16): 98–105. 
 
Regier, T. and Kay, P. (2009). Language, thought, and color: Whorf was half right. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 13, 439–46. 
 
Regier, T., Kay, P., and Cook, R. S. (2005). Focal colors are universal after all. PNAS, 102: 8386–
91. 
 
Regier, T., Kay, P., Gilbert, A., and Ivry, R. (2010). Language and thought: Which side are you 
on, anyway? In B. Malt and P. Wolff (eds.), Words and the mind: How words capture human 
experience. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 165–82. 
 
Regier, T., Kay, P., & Khetarpal, N. (2007). Color naming reflects optimal partitions of color 
space. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 1436–
1441.  
 
Roberson, D. (2012). Culture, categories and color – Do we see the world through t(a)inted lenses? 
In Gelfand, M., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (eds.), Advances in Culture and Psychology (Vol. 2). New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-52.  
 
Roberson, D., Damjanovic, L., & Pilling, M. (2007). Categorical perception of facial expressions: 
Evidence for a “category adjustment” model. Memory and Cognition, 35, 1814–1829.  
 
Roberson, D., & Davidoff, J. (2000). The categorical perception of colors and facial expressions: 
The effect of verbal interference. Memory and Cognition, 28, 977–986. 
  
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., & Braisby, N. (1999). Similarity and categorization: 
Neuropsychological evidence for a dissociation in explicit categorization tasks. Cognition, 
71, 1–42.  
 
	 23	
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R. L., & Shapiro, L. R. (2004). The development of color 
categories in two languages: A longitudinal study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
133, 554–571.  
 
Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R. L., & Shapiro, L. (2005a). Colour categories in Himba: 
Evidence for the cultural relativity hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 50, 378–411.  
 
Roberson, D., Davies, I. R. L., Corbett, G., & Vandervyver, M. (2005b). Free-sorting of colors 
across cultures: Are there universal grounds for grouping? Journal of Cognition and Culture, 
5, 349–386.  
 
Roberson, D., Davies, I. R. L., & Davidoff, J. (2000). Colour categories are not universal: 
Replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 129, 369–398.  
 
Roberson, D., and Hanley, J. R. (2009). Relatively speaking: What is the relationship between 
language and thought in the color domain? Glimpse, 2(3), 68–77.  
 
Roberson, D., Hanley, J. R., & Pak, H. (2009). Thresholds for color discrimination in English and 
Korean speakers. Cognition, 112, 482–487.  
 
Roberson, D., & Pak, H. S. (2009). Categorical perception of color is restricted to the right visual 
field in Korean speakers who maintain central fixation. Journal of Cognitive Science, 10, 41–
51.  
 
Roberson, D., Pak, H. S., & Hanley, J. R. (2008). Categorical perception of colour in the left and 
right visual field is verbally mediated: Evidence from Korean. Cognition, 107, 752–762. 
 
Rosch Heider, E. (1972). Universals in color naming and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 
93, 10–20.  
 
Rosch, E. (1973). Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 328–350.  
 
Rosch Heider, E. and Olivier, D. (1972) Universals in color naming and memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 93, 10–20. 
 
Saunders, B. A. C., & van Brakel, J. (1997). Are there non-trivial constraints on color 
categorization? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 167–178.  
 
Shepard, R. N. (1992). The perceptual organization of colors: An adaptation to regularities of the 
terrestrial world? In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: 
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (495–532). New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Smallman, H. & Boynton, R. (1990). Segregation of basic colours in an information display. 
Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 7(10), 1985-1994. 
 
Smallman, H. & Boynton, R. (1993). On the usefulness of color coding in an information display. 
Displays, 14, 158-165. 
 
	 24	
Steels, L., & Belpaeme, T. (2005). Coordinating perceptually grounded categories through 
language: A case study for colour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 469–489. 
 
Webster, M. A., & Kay, P. (2005). Variations in color naming within and across 
populations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 512-512. 
 
Whorf, B.L. (1956). Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, 
MA: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
 
Winawer, J., & Witthoft, N. (2012) Effects of color terms on color perception and cognition. In 
Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology. Springer: New York, pp. 1-8. 
doi:10.1007/SpringerReference_300496. 
 
Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian 
blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 7780-7785.  
 
Yendrikhovskij, S. N. (2001). Computing color categories from statistics of natural images. Journal 
of Imaging Science and Technology, 45, 409–417.  	
